A Board Does Not a Bench Make:  Denying Quasi-Judicial Immunity to Parole Board Members in Section 1983 Damages Actions by Thompson, Julio A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 1 
1988 
A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Quasi-Judicial 
Immunity to Parole Board Members in Section 1983 Damages 
Actions 
Julio A. Thompson 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Julio A. Thompson, A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Quasi-Judicial Immunity to Parole Board 
Members in Section 1983 Damages Actions, 87 MICH. L. REV. 241 (1988). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol87/iss1/7 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTES 
A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Quasi-Judicial 
Immunity to Parole Board Members in Section 1983 
Damages Actions 
"We're not judges. We don't have the same independence." 
- Anonymous Member, California Board of Prison Terms1 
INTRODUCTION 
H.I. McDunna stood before the three-member panel of the Ari-
zona State Board of Pardons and Paroles. In this hearing, the Board 
would determine whether to release H.I. ("Hi"), a three-time armed 
robber, once again. 
First Member: They got a name for people like you, Hi: Re-ci-di-vism. 
Second Member: Re-peat o-ffender. 
First Member: Not a pretty name, is it, Hi? 
Hi: No sir. That's one bonehead name, but that ain't me anymore. 
Second Member: You're not just telling us what we want to hear? 
Hi: No sir. No way. 
First Member: 'Cause we just want to hear the truth. 
Hi: Then I guess I am telling you what you want to hear. 
Second Member: Boy, didn't we just tell you not to do that? 
Hi: Yes sir. 
Second Member: (approving parole) Okay, then.2 
Although this scene is from a motion picture comedy, its depiction 
of a parole release hearing is not far from the mark. Conducting as 
many as 135 hearings a day,3 parole board members have few opportu-
nities to be thorough. More ominously, because of their low profile in 
the criminal justice system, parole board members have few checks on 
their authority. The results can be far from comedic. On numerous 
occasions, parole board members, through deliberate or reckless ac-
tion, have violated the constitutional rights of prisoners and members 
of society. 
The violations of prisoners' constitutional rights have occurred pri-
marily in two settings. The first is the parole revocation hearing, where 
a parolee, arrested and reimprisoned for an alleged parole violation, is 
allowed to hear and contest the charges against him. In Morrissey v. 
1. Girdner, Politics Plays Role in Parole Board's Rulings on "Lifers," L.A. Daily J., Apr. 19, 
1983, at 1, col. 6. 
2. Raising Arizona (Twentieth-Century Fox 1986). 
3. See Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole, in THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
DISCRETION AND THE LAW 148, 171 (2d ed. 1982). 
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Brewer, 4 the Supreme Court held that a parolee has a right to proce-
dural due process at these hearings. Yet, for over a decade, allegations 
of violations of prisoners' Morrissey rights by parole board members 
have continued. Alleged procedural due process violations have in-
cluded conspiracy to fabricate charges against the parolee, 5 exclusion 
of a prisoner's attorney, denial of his right to confront hostile wit-
nesses, denial of the right to a speedy hearing, 6 and even complete 
denial of a revocation hearing. 7 The second setting for the violation of 
prisoners' rights is the parole release hearing. In release hearings, the 
Supreme Court has declared that prisoners' rights are not guaranteed 
by Morrissey, but depend upon the expectations created by state stat· 
utes. 8 Finally, it is possible that parole board members may violate the 
constitutional rights of citizens by recklessly paroling highly danger-
ous prisoners. Such paroles may lead to the serious injury or death of 
innocent members of the public. 9 
In theory at least, all victims suffering constitutional violations at 
the hands of state officials have a remedy under 42 U.S.C. section 
1983.10 The language of section 1983 seems to permit no exception 
from its sweep. Likewise, the legislative history of section 198311 con-
tains no evidence that Congress intended any exception whatsoever.12 
4. 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972). 
5. See Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1986). 
6. See Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984). 
7. See Pope v. Chew, 521F.2d400 (4th Cir. 1975). 
8. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-12 
(1979); cf Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (statutory provision for good-time 
credits creates an interest protected by due process clause; once a statute or state practice creates 
such an interest, due process protections are necessary "to insure that the state-created right is 
not arbitrarily abrogated"). 
9. While numerous cases exist describing serious injury to private citizens caused by parolees, 
courts have been reluctant to find a deprivation of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Nelson v. 
Balazic, 802 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1986) (victims kidnapped and sodomized by recent parolee, but 
deprivation of constitutional rights not found by the court); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 
1983) (three women raped, shot, beaten and set on fire by parolee); Reiff v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 397 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (victim shot and permanently injured by recent 
parolee; suit allowed on negligence grounds, but constitutional deprivation only tacitly acknowl-
edged). Cf Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977) 
(en bane) (state tort action brought by victims shot and killed by released psychotic inmate). 
For a cursory glance at the causation issues posed by characterizing such actions as constitu-
tional violations at the hands of parole board members, see notes 144-45 infra and accompanying 
text. However, a thorough discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
11. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (187J) (first enacted as§ 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871). 
12. The Act's avowed purpose, to enforce the fourteenth amendment, was a response to a 
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To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need demonstrate only that she 
was deprived of a constitutional right by a state official acting under 
"color" of state law.13 However, since 1951, the Supreme Court has 
carved out numerous exceptions to the coverage of section 1983 by 
giving certain governmental actors official immunity from suit. Today 
judges, 14 police officers, 15 prosecutors, 16 governors, 17 cabinet mem-
bers, 18 and presidents of the United States19 have been accorded either 
absolute or qualified immunity. 
Absolute, or quasi-judicial, immunity means exactly that. When 
the doctrine applies, it is not possible to maintain a personal damage 
suit against the government official for injuries sustained as a result of 
her official conduct, no matter how extensive or egregious the consti-
tutional injury. If absolute immunity applies, the plaintiff may seek 
only injunctive relief under section 198320 or criminal prosecution 
under 18 U.S.C. section 242.2 1 
Qualified immunity, on the other hand, exposes officials to dam-
ages liability only if they violate a "clearly established" constitutional 
right. This objective standard, established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 22 is 
a radical departure from the rule in previous decisions requiring the 
plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with malicious intent.23 The 
period of lawlessness in the southern states marked by the toleration of acts of violence by state 
and local governments against certain classes of the citizenry. See Gressman, The Unhappy His-
tory of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICHL. REv. 1323, 1334 (1952). For a thorough history of 
§ 1983, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of 
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Under 42 U.S.C 
§ 1983: Protecting the Right To Be Free of Protectionist State Action, 86 MICH. L. REv. 157, 175-
78 (1987); Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 387 (1967). 
13. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The latter element, acting "under color 
of state or territorial law," known as the "state action" requirement, may be met even if the act 
of the official violates state law, so long as the official is vested with the authority of the state. 
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183·87. 
14. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (absolute immunity for state judges). 
15. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 557 (qualified immunity for police officers). 
16. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors). 
17. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (qualified immunity for governor and aides). 
18. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (absolute immunity for Secretary of Agriculture 
and various departmental hearing examiners). 
19. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (absolute immunity for President). 
20. In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed its reluctance to grant injunctive relief. 
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (stating that injunctive relief under§ 1983 should 
be granted sparingly). 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982). Section 242 charges usually arise in cases where state officials 
employ unlawful force. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (upholding § 242 
conviction of police officer extracting confessions by means of beatings with rubber hose, pistol, 
club, and other items). Official immunity doctrine does not apply to § 242. See Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972) (official immunity does not reach "so far as to immunize crimi-
nal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress"). 
22. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
23. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (Ohio governor sued under§ 1983 for 
decision to deploy National Guardsmen at Kent State during May 1970 demonstrations against 
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Harlow Court abandoned this rule because it was convinced that, 
given the difficulty of defining the relevant evidence, an inquiry into 
the defendant's subjective state of mind would require intensive dis-
covery - including numerous depositions of the defendant and col-
leagues - and full-scale trials. To minimize the social costs associated 
with such disruption, the Court felt compelled to limit official liability 
to cases where the reasonableness of official conduct could be deter-
mined objectively and unobtrusively.24 
Although the legal standards distinguishing the two levels of im-
munity have been refined, it remains unclear which level of immunity 
state parole board members should enjoy. In Martinez v. California, 25 
the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on what level of im-
munity, if any, should be accorded parole board members in the 
course of their official duties. 26 Several courts of appeals have ad-
dressed the issue, with differing results. The Ninth Circuit, in Sellars 
v. Procunier, 21 awarded parole board members absolute immunity 
from damage actions brought by prisoners for actions taken when 
processing alleged parole violations. The First, Fourth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have largely followed the Sellars court's 
lead. 28 The Third Circuit has only partially accepted the majority ap-
Vietnam War); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members sued under 
§ 1983 for alleged due process violations in connection with expulsion of students for "spiking" 
punch at the meeting of an extracurricular school organization). In Scheuer, the Court failed to 
define the full scope of qualified immunity, introducing instead the defense of "good faith." 416 
U.S. at 247-48. In Wood, the Court attempted to provide a precise, two-pronged standard 
against which official conduct could be measured. The Court held that immunity would be de· 
nied if either: (1) the official knew or should have known her conduct would violate clearly 
established constitutional rights; or (2) the official acted with a malicious intent to violate the 
plaintiff's constitutional rights. 420 U.S. at 322. 
The Harlow court effectively eliminated the second, subjective prong of the Wood test, and 
remanded the case to allow the parties to resolve the immunity issue in a motion for summary 
judgment. 457 U.S. at 819-20. 
24.A57 U.S. at 817-18. For the implications of this standard for parole board officials, see 
notes 130-31 infra and accompanying text. 
For a more complete account of the immunities granted to various government officials, see 
Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights 
Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L. REv. 941 (1977). 
25. 444 U.S. 277 (1980). 
26. 444 U.S. at 285 n.11. 
27. 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981). In Anderson v. Boyd, 714 
F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit extended this immunity to the imposition of parole 
conditions and parole revocation. 
28. The Eighth Circuit closely followed the Ninth Circuit's lead. It first granted absolute 
immunity to parole board members "deciding to grant, deny, or revoke parole" in Evans v. 
Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 1985). It then echoed Anderson by extending absolute 
immunity to board members carrying out official duties in Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 
1985) (per curiam). Finally, the Court applied this principle to actions brought by injured third 
parties in Nelson v. Balazic, 802 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1986) (parole board member entitled to 
absolute immunity in § 1983 damages action brought by three women kidnapped and sodomized 
by recent parolee). 
The Seventh Circuit has been generous to parole officials by broadly defining their "official 
duties,'' thereby cloaking virtually all of their actions with absolute immunity. See, e.g .. Trotter 
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proach. In Thompson v. Burke, 29 the court of appeals held that parole 
board members are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity when 
engaged in adjudicatory duties, but should receive only qualified im-
munity when engaged in administrative or executive duties.30 But sev-
eral courts of appeals have criticized this adjudicatory/administrative 
dichotomy as unrealistic and impracticable.31 
This Note argues that neither the majority nor the minority ap-
proach is realistic. A thorough examination of the parole process and 
section 1983 litigation will show that a third approach is more appro-
priate - that parole board members are entitled only to qualified· im-
munity for all actions taken within the scope of their official duties. 
Part I argues that parole board members should not enjoy absolute, 
quasi-judicial immunity because the parole board decisionmaking pro-
cess is not "functionally comparable"32 to judic~al decisionmaking. 
The differences in procedure, political accountability, training, and 
background lead to two very different systems. Part II shows that 
adopting qualified immunity will also improve the parole decisionmak-
v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th Cir. 1984) (parole revocation and related actions are "part 
and parcel of the decision process" and thereby enjoy absolute' immunity). 
The First and Tenth Circuits followed Sellars with little variation . .See Johnson v. Rhode 
Island Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1987); Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d 450 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion even before the Ninth 
Circuit pronouncement in Sellars. See Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1975). 
While noting the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sellars, the Fifth Circuit pas not explicitly relied 
upon that case in deciding that parole board members shoi4d enjoy absolute immunity for the 
decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole. See Serio v. Members of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 
F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1987) (parole release hearings); Farrish v. Mississippi State Parole Bd., 836 
F.2d 969, 975 (5th Cir. 1988) (mentioning but not relying on Sellars). The scope of immunity in 
the Fifth Circuit for other actions is less clear. In Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 658-59 (5th 
Cir. 1979), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for a parole· board member who 
allegedly interfered with a parolee's business ventures on the ground of qualified immunity. The 
Farrish court expressed no opinion about the appropriate level of immunity for such conduct. 
836 F.2d at 975. 
Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not yet aqdressed the immunity 
issue, at least one district court in that circuit has awarded absolute immunity to parole board 
members. See, e.g., Jane Doe v. United Social & Mental Health Servs,, 670 F. Supp. 1121, 1124-
25 (D. Conn. 1987) (absolute immunity from damages suit brought by administrator of victim 
murdered by parolee). However, another district court was willing to pursue the adjudicative-
administrative dichotomy employed by the Third Circuit. Jones v. Coughlin, 665 F. Supp. 1040, 
1045-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (absolute immunity for setting excessive parole conditions). 
29. 556 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1977). 
30. 556 F.2d at 236. See also Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986). 
31. See Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd., 769 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 1065 (1986) (arguing that even if adjudicatory/administrative distinction could be made, it 
could "only be delineated through burdensome litigation which would unduly disrupt the 
Board's functions"); accord Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d at 7. 
This Note does not separately address the practical difficulties that the minority approach 
may raise because, with respect to so-called "adjudicatory" actions of parole board members, 
that approach subscribes to the majority view that board members are similar to judges and 
require absolute immunity in order to preserve their independent judgment. Thus, this Note's 
frontal attack on the majority view should be understood as a critique of the "adjudicatory func-
tion" aspect of the minority approach as well. 
32. For a complete definition of this term see Part I.A infra. 
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ing process by fostering disincentives for unconstitutional conduct. 
Parole board members themselves would be more careful to respect 
well-established constitutional rights, and state government would be 
more likely to implement better selection, training, and risk-manage-
ment procedures. Finally, Part III illustrates that limiting the immu-
nity of parole board members is necessary to provide both monetary 
and symbolic relief to victims of unconstitutional conduct. Other 
forms of relief, such as habeas corpus, are inadequate to protect pris-
oners and parolees, and completely unavailable to victims. With no 
effective forms of relief, section 1983 rings hollow. But if parole board 
members are given only qualified immunity from suit, then section 
1983 will serve the cause for which it was enacted - to compensate 
those whose constitutional rights have been violated. The road to this 
vindication of section 1983 begins with an exploration of the differ-
ences between parole boards and courts and the great differences be-
tween the players themselves: parole board members and judges. 
I. PAROLE BOARDS AND THE "FUNCTIONAL" APPROACH TO 
SECTION 1983 IMMUNITY 
Judges are given immunity from suit so that they will make impar-
tial decisions uninfluenced by the possibility of personal liability. The 
basic assumption behind the majority and minority approaches to pa-
role board member immunity is that parole board officials so closely 
resemble judges that at least some of their official conduct should be 
cloaked with absolute, quasi-judicial immunity, so that they too may 
be impartial decisionmakers. By first describing immunity doctrine 
and then comparing parole board members with judges, this Part will 
demonstrate that this fundamental assumption is groundless for two 
reasons. First, the parole process is far more bureaucratic than adjudi-
catory. Prisoners, if not wholly excluded from participation, play a 
minimal role in the system. Second, parole board members lack the 
political insularity and qualifications of judges. Removable at the gov-
ernor's will, board members are political animals and often behave 
accordingly. 
A. The Test in Butz v. Economou 
The Supreme Court has developed two lines of analysis in deter-
mining the appropriate level of official immunity. The first considers 
the status of the office over the course of Anglo-American legal his-
tory. For example, in Tenney v. Brandhove, 33 the Supreme Court rea-
soned that the common law tradition of absolute immunity for 
legislators made it highly unlikely that the drafters of section 1983 
could have intended to do away with that tradition without an express 
33. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
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declaration of that intent. 34 Likewise, in Pierson v. Ray, 35 the Court 
accorded absolute immunity to judges because "[f]ew doctrines were 
more solidly established at common law" than judicial immunity.36 
Because this analysis is inapplicable to officials in positions of re-
cent vintage, the Court developed a second line of analysis involving 
explicit policy considerations. Specifically, the Court began to weigh 
the private interests of compensation for and deterrence of constitu-
tional wrongs against the public interest in preserving the independent 
judgment of state officials. 37 In Butz v. Economou, 38 the Supreme 
Court presented this analysis in its most refined and formulaic mode 
and established the prevailing approach to the question of parole 
board immunity. 
Butz v. Economou involved a suit by a commodity futures 
merchant alleging that several officials in the U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture had deprived him of his constitutional rights to free speech 
and procedural due process. The complaint stated that, in response to 
"sharply critical" remarks the plaintiff made, several departmental of- , 
ficials - including the Secretary of Agriculture, the assistant secre-
tary, the chief hearing examiner and the judicial officer of the 
department - initiated administrative proceedings to revoke his regis-
tration as a futures merchant. Addressing the issue of the appropriate 
level of immunity for federal executive officials, the Butz Court stated 
that qualified immunity was the general rule. 39 A blanket rule of abso-
lute immunity for executive officials would, the Court reasoned, effec-
tively subordinate the constitutional interests of victims to the 
interests of those who caused the injuries. 40 Despite its announced 
34. 341 U.S. at 376. See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980). 
35. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
36. 386 U.S. at 553-54. See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872) (absolute 
immunity for federal judges). More recently, judicial immunity has come under increasing at-
tack. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal for Limited Liabil-
ity, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 549 (1978); Comment, Judicial Immunity: An Unqualified Sanction of 
Tyranny from the Bench, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 810 (1978); Note, Immunity of Federal and State 
Judges from Civil Suit - Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. L. REv. 727 (1977). 
37. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976) ("The public trust of the 
prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in every decision by the consequences in 
terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages."). These policy considerations did not 
go unnoticed before the Pierson Court when it utilized the historical analysis of the issue of 
judicial immunity. Indeed, the Court underscored its decision with the observation that expo-
sure to damages liability would result "not [in] principled and fearless decision-making but [in] 
intimidation." 386 U.S. at 554. 
38. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
39. 438 U.S. at 507. 
40. 438 U.S. at 505. The plaintiff in Butz brought his action against federal executive officials 
directly under the Constitution. Cf Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau 
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). However, the Court stated that, for purposes of immunity 
doctrine, there was no distinction between suits brought under the Constitution against federal 
officials and those brought under § 1983 against state officials. 438 U.S. at 507. Thus, Butz is 
authoritative in § 1983 actions. 
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general rule of qualified immunity, the Court noted that "there are 
some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from 
liability."41 According to the Court, the nature of the official's func-
tion, rather than her particular location within the government, was 
the relevant consideration. For example, judges and those "function-
ally comparable" to them, such as grand jurors and prosecutors, re-
quired absolute immunity in order that they may undertake their 
duties free of "harassment or intimidation."42 
The Supreme Court also pointed out that the safeguards in the ju-
dicial process reduce the need for a private damages action as a means 
to deter unconstitutional conduct. The Court found several safe-
guards important: (1) the insulation of the judge from political influ-
ence, (2) the importance of precedent to judges resolving 
controversies, (3) the adversarial nature of the judicial process, and 
(4) the ability to correct error on appeal.43 
In applying the functional comparability test to the Butz defen-
dants, the Court conducted a two-part inquiry. First, the Court asked 
whether the defendants exercised judge-like powers and whether the 
administrative proceedings over which they presided were similar to 
cases heard by judges. Second, the Court looked for the presence of 
numerous safeguards against unconstitutional conduct in the agency.44 
This second prong of the functional comparability test - the exist-
ence of safeguards preventing unconstitutional conduct - appears to 
be the essential foundation underlying absolute immunity: 
In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an unconstitutional 
act by one presiding at an agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the 
importance of preserving the independent judgment of these men and 
women. We therefore hold that persons subject to these restraints and 
performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled to 
absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts. 45 
Accordingly, determining which executive officials pass the func-
tional comparability test and thus possess absolute, quasi-;judicial im-
munity requires courts not only to compare the officials' powers and 
duties to those of judges, but also to look for the existence of institu-
41. 438 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added). 
42. 438 U.S. at 512-13. Although credit for the "functional comparability" test is given to 
Butz, the term first appeared in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976), discussed at 
note 37 supra. 
43. 438 U.S. at 512. 
44. 438 U.S. at 513-14. In particular, the Court found the following safeguards present in 
the administrative hearing: (1) adversarial proceedings, (2) political insularity of the trier of fact, 
(3) the record for decision consists exclusively of the pleadings, transcripts of testimony and 
exhibits, (4) availability to both parties of the findings offact and law by the examiner, (5) ability 
of both parties to present oral or documentary evidence, (6) inability of the Hearing Examiner to 
discuss the controversy without first notifying the parties and offering them an opportunity to 
participate, and (7) availability of agency or judicial review. 
45. 438 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added). 
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tional checks minimizing the risk of unconstitutional conduct.46 
B. The Nature of the Parole Decisionmaking Process 
249 
A careful examination of the various parole models employed by 
the states is a necessary first step in determining whether parole board 
members are so functionally comparable to judges that they deserve 
the blanket protection of absolute immunity. 
The federal courts of appeals frequently discuss Butz, but devote 
little time and effort to investigating the nature of the parole decision-
making process when applying it. A thorough investigation of the pa-
role process reveals that it differs from the judicial decisionmaking 
process in several important respects.47 First, parole systems vary 
greatly.48 To subscribe to the notion that there is one parole system in 
some Platonic sense49 is at best naive, and at worst intellectually dis-
honest. This diversity of systems is quite unlike the relative uniform.-
ity of the judiciary. Second, the selection, treatment, and consequent 
behavior of parole board members is very different from that of judges. 
These differences give rise to the need for differences in the level of 
immunity for each. 
1. The Decisionmaking Framework 
The parole systems in the United States roughly fall into two basic 
models: the discretionary system and the mandatory release system. so 
In the former, the parole board has full discretion in awarding and 
revoking parole. In the latter, the release decision is based upon statu-
tory formulae.st 
In the discretionary system, the parole board may have to follow 
46. Branham, State Parole Decisions: The Scope of Immunity Accorded Parole Board Mem-
bers Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1983 S. ILL. U. L.J. 281, 294. 
47. Unfortunately, the existing case law exhibits a tendency to make sweeping generaliza-
tions about the independence and integrity of parole board members. This tendency is not 
unique to the lower courts. The Supreme Court has also noted, in purely conclusory language, 
that parole boards are relatively "neutral and detached" hearing bodies. See Cleavinger v. 
Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204 (1985) (prison disciplinary committee less impartial than parole 
board); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole board is "neutral and detached" 
hearing body). 
48. See Mason v. Melendez, 525 F. Supp. 270, 277 (W.D. Wis. 1981): 
[S]ome members of some parole departments promulgate the conditions to be imposed upon 
parolees, some supervise and counsel with parolees, some investigate possible violations of 
conditions of parole, some recommend termination of parole and others order the termina-
tion, some promulgate the standards by which parole is to be granted or withheld, some 
recommend the grant of parole and others order it granted. 
49. The reference here is to Plato's theory of Forms, or Ideas. Specifically, it refers to the 
metaphysical component of that theory, which maintains that a word like "table" denotes a 
certain ideal table - unvarying and eternal in space and time. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, 
Book X, 522 (B. Jowett trans. 1944). 
50. See Branham, supra note 46, at 295-97. 
51. This model is beyond the focus of this Note, which is concerned with the consequences of 
discretionary acts of parole board members. It need only be said that these systems would not 
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some statutory decisionmaking standards for parole decisions, but 
these guidelines tend to be minimal and open-ended. 52 More often, 
departmental tradition dictates what criteria are to be used.53 Parole 
board members may collect and review a whole range of information. 
For example, they may consider, in addition to the circumstances of 
the crime and the inmate's record, the following factors: (1) physical 
and psychological reports, (2) familial relationships and community 
ties, and (3) institutional reports about the inmate's prison activities 
and/or misconduct.54 These reports may contain unverifiable infor-
mation such as guard observations and rumors about the prisoner 
heard by correctional officials. 55 This lack of evidentiary rigor in a 
generate § 1983 litigation against board members who were merely obeying a statutory com· 
mand; instead, litigation would challenge the statute itself. 
52. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(e) (1981 & Supp. 1986) (parole rests in opinion of 
parole board); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1003-3-5(c)(l-3) (Smith-Hurd 1982) (parole may be 
denied if parole board determines there is a substantial risk prisoner cannot follow conditions of 
parole, if release would belittle the gravity of the offense, or if release would substantially impair 
penal discipline); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 259-i(2)(c) (McKinney 1982) (release permitted ifthere is a 
reasonable probability that inmate will not violate the law, if release is "not incompatible with the 
welfare of society," and if parole would not deprecate the gravity of the offense); Mo. REv. 
STAT.§ 217.690 (1986) ("When in its opinion there is reasonable probability that an inmate ••• 
can be released without detriment to the community or to himself, the board may in its discretion 
release or parole such person •••• ") (emphasis added). AI.A. CODE§ 15-22-26 (1982) (same); 
COLO. REv. STAT. § 17-2-201(4)(a) (1986) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.1099(l)(a-b), (3) 
(1986) (same with exception for death and life without parole sentence); R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8· 
14 (1956) (same); ALAsKA STAT. § 33.16.100 (1986) (same), GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-42(c) 
(1985) (same); VA. CoDE .ANN.§ 53.1-136(4) (1982) (same); ARK. CoDE ANN.§ 16-93-20l(f)(l) 
(1987) (board has complete discretion); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-25(D) (1978) (complete 
discretion). 
53. See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN.§ 16-93-20l(f){4) (1987) ("All policies, rules, and regulations 
regarding parole shall be formulated by the Parole Board •••. "); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21· 
25(D) (1978) (same). 
54. See AI.A. CoDE § 15-22-25(a) (1982); ALAsKA STAT. § 33.16.110 (1986); ARK. CODE 
.ANN. § 16-93-203 (1987); GA. CoDE ANN. § 42-9-43 (1985 & Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 83-1,115 (1987); VA. CoDE ANN. § 53.1-155 (1982 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 
1003-3-4(d)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1987); Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 
115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227, 1234 (1977) (en bane). 
55. See N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 144 (1983). The 
Supreme Court has given the introduction of such information its imprimatur. In Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 l,J.S. 778 (1973), the Supreme Court, after finding no difference between probation 
and parole revocation for constitutional purposes, 411 U.S. at 782 & n. 3, noted: 
[A] criminal trial under our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique charac-
teristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented not by a prose-
cutor, but by a parole officer •.. ;formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed: 
and the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of proba-
tion or parole. 
411 U.S. at 779 (emphasis added). 
One result of this relaxed standard is that otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence may be 
considered in parole revocation hearings. See United States v. Miller, 514 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 
1975) (per curiam); State v. Marrapese, 122 R.I. 494, 409 A.2d 544 (1979); Ward v. Parole Bd., 
35 Mich. App. 456, 192 N.W.2d 537 (1971). However, courts have been reluctant to permit 
hearsay evidence to stand as the sole ground for a board's decision. See Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 
119, 606 P.2d 156 (1980); People v. Lewis, 28 Ill. App. 3d 777, 329 N.E.2d 390 (1975). 
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parole release or revocation proceeding is an important distinction be-
tween such hearings and judicial proceedings. 
In some instances, the prisoner himself may provide information to 
the parole board. 56 Because most state statutes do not require a per-
sonal appearance before the board, this information is usually writ-
ten. 57 This procedure stands in stark contrast to the right of the 
accused to be heard in a judicial proceeding. 58 
The brief and informal nature of the hearing itself produces a 
nonadversarial atmosphere. In many cases the irimate does not make 
a personal appearance before the board,59 and even when the inmate 
does appear, he often has little chance to do more than field questions 
fired at him from across the table. 60 Studies have shown that the pa-
role board hearings tend to last only a few minutes from the time the 
prisoner enters the room until a preliminary determination is made.61 
Moreover, only a few jurisdictions permit an attorney to accompany 
the inmate;62 and even where it is permitted, few prisoners can afford 
private counsel at parole hearings after incarceration for several years, 
so any state-created right to counsel has little meaning. 63 
One feature of some systems is the requirement that the board pro-
vide a written record of the reasons supporting its parole decision. 64 
However, review of the board's decision may be quite limited. In New 
York, for example, judicial review of parole board actions is unavaila-
ble if the actions are taken "in accordance with law."65 When judicial 
56. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.110(a)(2), (7) (1986); NEB. R.Ev. STAT.§ 83-1, 115(6) (1987); 
see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 349.3 (1981). 
57. See Branham, supra note 46, at 296. Although most states have not granted prisoners the 
right to attend parole hearings, an increasing number have granted a right of attendance to vic-
tims. See Victim's Relatives Opposing Parole, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1987, at 29, col. 1 (number of 
states granting victims attendance rights rising from 6 in 1982 to 33 by 1986). 
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
59. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 
60. Indeed, the statutes typically grant the prisoner an "interview." See, e.g., COLO. REv. 
STAT. § 17-2-201(9)(a)(I) (1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.690(3) (1986). 
61. Averages vary from state to state. Two states with more thorough systems, Michigan 
and Wisconsin, have been known to spend an average of 10-20 minutes per hearing. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the Kansas system was reported to devote an average of 2-3 minutes per 
inmate, leading to as many as 135 hearings a day. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 171. See also 
ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL CoMMISSION ON ATTICA 
96-97 (1972) (New York parole board spending average of 5.9 minutes per prisoner hearing). 
62. See OR. REv. STAT. § 144.123 (1987) (inmate.may be accompanied by any one person of 
his choice); cf. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,112(2) (1980) (inmate may consult anyone, including 
legal counsel, in preparing for hearing). 
63. Occasionally, law students have assisted in representing prisoners free of charge. See 
Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1975). Of course, the effectiveness of such representation is 
open to question. 
64. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, 1[ 1003-3-5(f) (1987); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 259-i(2)(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1982 & Supp. 1988) (board must provide reasons for denial of parole); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-21-25(C) (1978 & Supp. 1987) (same). 
65. N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 259-i(5) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1988). Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 17-2-201(9)(c) (1986 & Supp. 1987) (prisoner appeal of revocation limited to board itself). 
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review is permitted, a marked deference to parole boards is easy to 
detect. 66 In most cases, an inmate's only hope for review is the possi-
bility that the entire parole board may review the hearing panel's 
actions.67 
With these details of the parole decisionmaking framework in 
mind, it becomes apparent that the settings for parole board and judi-
cial decisionmaking are quite different. This dissimilarity is also re-
flected in the decisionmakers themselves. The following discussion 
points out the many differences between board members and judges: 
differences in political accountability, status, tenure, and qualification. 
2. Parole Board Members 
The selection and treatment of parole board members play a large 
role in shaping the parole process. Parole board members belong to 
the executive branch which, unlike the state judiciary, generally enjoys 
only qualified immunity. 68 Operating under the governor, parole 
board members are far more vulnerable to political pressures than 
judges. As a consequence, their approach to decisionmaking is quite 
different from that of judges. 
The parole board members themselves are typically selected by gu-
bernatorial appointment subject to legislative approval. 69 The term of 
appointment ranges from three to six years, 70 although governors gen-
erally are empowered to remove board members. 71 
66. See P. CROMWELL, G. KILLINGER, H. KERPER & c. WALKER, PROBATION AND PA-
ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 207 (2d ed. 1985) (hereinafter PROBATION AND PA-
ROLE] ("(T]he prevailing view of the courts has been one of noninterference in parole release 
decisions."); see also LEGISLATIVE BUDGET AND FINANCE COMMITTEE, PENNSYLVANIA GEN· 
ERAL AssEMBLY, A SUNSET PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBA· 
TION AND PAROLE PURSUANT TO ACT 1981-142, 36 (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter SUNSET AUDIT] 
(only 1.3% of a random sample of parole board decisions overruled between 1980-1984). 
67. Branham, supra note 46, at 297. Of course, prisoners may seek other remedies, such as 
habeas corpus relief. However, no such alternatives exist for victims of wrongfully released 
parolees. 
68. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 507; note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
69. ALA. CODE§ 15-22-20(b) (1982); ALAsKA STAT. § 33.16.020 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-93-201(a)(l) (1987); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2-201(1)(a) (1986 & Bradford Supp. 1987); 
GA. CoDE ANN. § 42-9-2(a) (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1003-3-l(b) (1987); Mo. REV. 
STAT.§ 217.665(1) (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-189 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-24(A) 
(1978 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 259-b(l) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1988); VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 53.1-134 (1982 &Michie Supp. 1987). In Nevada the governor alone makes the appoint· 
ment. NEV. REv. STAT. § 213.108(2) (1986). 
70. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-21-24(B) (1978) (three years); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 13·8· 
1 (1981) (three years); FLA. STAT. § 947.03(1) (1987) (four years); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 144.005(2)(1987) (four years); ALAsKA STAT. § 33.16.020(b) (1986) (five years); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-93-201(a)(3) (1987) (five years); ALA. CoDE § 15-22-20(c) (1982) (six years); Mo. 
REV. STAT. § 217.665(3) (1986) (six years); ILL REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1003-3-l(c) (1987) (six 
years); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-b(l) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1988) (six years); s.c. CODE 
ANN. § 24-21-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1987) (six years). 
71. See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN. § 16-93-201(d) (1987) (removal for "cause"); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 17-2-201(1)(a) (1986 & Supp. 1987) (removal for incompetency, neglect of duty, malfea-
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It is precisely this threat of removal that introduces the political 
element into the process. In Virginia, for example, members are re-
minded by statute that they "serve at the pleasure of the Governor."72 
In most states, the pressure is less explicit, but equally palpable. For 
example, California Deputy Attorney General Anthony Dicce once 
professed that gubernatorial pressure is felt by all parole board mem-
bers, even those appointed by a previous administration: 
The board is always subject to some degree of politics because board 
members are always appointed by the governor . . . . If you or I were on 
the board and wanted to get appointed again, and got an impression of 
how the governor felt, we might behave accordingly.73 
Dicce's point is well made. Because the criminal justice system 
involves powerful political issues, parole board members' livelihood 
depends on whether they are an asset or liability to the administra-
tion. 74 As a result, parole board members are prone to bend to com-
munity pressure in connection with decisions to award or deny parole 
to notorious criminals. Periodically, the political stature of parole 
boards has permitted popular opinion to effect dramatic reversals in 
policy.75 
The susceptibility of board members to political pressures is exac-
sance, failure to use state risk assessment guidelines or failure to attend meetings); FLA. STAT. 
§ 947.03(3) (1987) (removal for malfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, per-
manent inability to perform duties, or pleading or being found guilty of a felony); ILL. REv. 
STAT. ch. 38, 1003-3-l(c) (1987) (removal for "cause"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-24(C) (1978 
& Supp. 1987) (removal for incompetency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance). N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 259-b(6) (McKinney 1982) (removal for "cause"); OR. REv. STAT. § 144.005(2) (1987) (re-
moval for "inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office") (emphasis added); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 24-21-11 (Law. Co-op. 1976·& Supp. 1987) (governor may remove for "misconduct, 
neglect of duty, malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance," but must afford board member op-
portunity to be heard); VA. CODE ANN.§ 53.1-134 (1982 & Supp. 1987) ("The members of the 
Parole Board shall serve at the pleasure of the governor."). Because the power of removal is very 
broad, "it is not unusual to have a new board appointed when a new governor takes office." 
PROBATION & PAROLE, supra note 66, at 168. 
72. VA. CODE ANN.§ 53.1-134 (1982 & Supp. 1987). 
73. Girdner, supra note 1, at 1, col. 6. 
74. See, e.g., PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 66, at 168 ("[I]t is not unusual to have a 
new board appointed when a new governor takes office."); Cuomo Fails Third Time to Replace 
Parole Chief. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1984, at B2, col. 5 (New York governor seeking to replace 
chairman of State Board of Parole critical of his criminal justice initiatives); Cuomo Names 
Youth Division Official to Head Parole Board, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1984, at Bl, col. 6. (named 
successor to Chairman of State Parole Board promising, "Clearly, you're going to see a marked 
reduction in the number of people paroled."). 
75. The Fain case in California serves as a good example. In 1982, the California Board of 
Prison Terms paroled convicted murderer and rapist William Archie Fain. Fain had served 15 
years of his sentence as an ideal prisoner and had become a born-again Christian. After the 
family of one of Fain's victims collected over 62,000 signatures on petitions protesting the action, 
the board rescinded Fain's parole. See Leland, Politics, the Public and Parole, CAL. LAW., Apr. 
1984, at 16-17; Girdner, supra note 1; see also Wasik & Pease, The Parole Veto and Pany Politics, 
86 CRIM. L. REV. 379-82 (June, 1986); Political Pressures Cited in New York Parole Case, 17 
CRIM. Jus. NEWSL. 6 (Feb. 3, 1986). 
Occasionally, parole board members themselves admit that their traditionally political posi-
tions distinguish them from the judiciary. See text at note 1 supra. 
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erbated by their professional standing. In the first place, they do not 
enjoy the prestige and respect accorded to judges. In fact, over one 
half of the parole board members in this country are part-time em-
ployees. 76 Thus, many parole board members have two bosses - the 
governor and the private employer - who may have something to say 
about the politics of parole. By contrast, state judges, even elected 
ones, are insulated from such daily pressures. As one parole board 
member put it, "We're not judges. We don't ·have the same 
independence."77 
In the second place, parole board members have a stronger per-
sonal incentive to maintain the correct political line. It is unlikely that 
many parole board members have the educational background of 
judges. 78 The implications of this disparity upon relative opportunities 
for jobs of equal pay79 or status (i.e., a government post) are obvious. 
Put frankly, board members have more to lose than judges. 
Clearly, all of these factors undermine the perception that parole 
boards are detached hearing bodies. Unlike courts, parole boards usu-
ally have little statutory guidance in the factors which should be con-
sidered in release decisions. There are few evidentiary requirements, 
and procedural due process safeguards are greatly diminished. The 
parole board members themselves are subject to far more political 
pressure than judges, but at the same time, they are given almost as 
much authority over the lives of prisoners. Keeping these differences 
in mind, a more enlightened application of the functional comparabil-
ity test may now be undertaken. 
C. Applying the Functional Comparability Test 
to State Parole Boards 
Having investigated the details of the parole process, a comparison 
76. See PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 66, at 168. Moreover, a number of states pay 
board members so poorly that a second job is a necessity. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-
201(C)(l) (1987) (salary $60 per working day plus travel expenses); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 332.5 
(1981 & Supp. 1987) (annual salary $3,600 plus travel expenses). 
77. Girdner, supra note 1, at 1, col. 6. 
78. In Pennsylvania for example, there are no minimum education or experience require-
ments for membership on its five-member parole board. See SUNSET AUDIT, supra note 66, at 
26. By contrast, the New York Parole Board requires a bachelor's degree in the fields relating to 
law or sociology or five years of corrections experience. Pennsylvania's lack of requirements is 
hardly unique. Many other states either have no education experience requirement at all, see, 
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-20l(a)(2) (1987); FLA. STAT.§ 947.01 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-9-2 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 213.108 (1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 332 (1981), or merely 
require that members be "qualified," see, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 15-22-20(b) (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 217.665(2) (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-189 (1987) (all five members 
need to be of "good character and judicious temperament" and at least one member must have a 
professional background in corrections); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-21-24 (1978 & Supp. 1987). See 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 259-(b)(2) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1988). 
79. The strength of this incentive, of course, varies from state to state. Compare Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 217.665(7) (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1988) ($45,000 annual salary) with OKLA. STAT. tit. 
57, § 332.5 (1981 & Supp. 1987) ($3,600 annual salary). 
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between it and the judicial system in accordance with Butz v. Econo-
mou is in order. The earlier efforts by the courts of appeals to make 
such comparisons failed to include a thorough discussion of the many 
differences between parole board hearings and judicial proceedings 
discussed above. In this section, a faithful application of the func-
tional comparability test reveals that parole board members fail to 
meet the Butz requirements. 
1. Of Boards and Benches: The Wooden Approach of Sellars 
Consideration of the inadequacies of the prevailing judicial ap-
proach to parole board member immunity illustrates why a new appli-
cation of the functional comparability test in this context is required. 
The discussion in the leading case on the issue, Sellars v. Procunier, 80 
leaves much unanswered. 
As mentioned earlier, 81 Sellars v. Procunier has been so well 
received by other courts of appeals that they have opted to quote ma-
jor portions of it rather than embark upon the Butz inquiry them-
selves. 82 Sellars involved a section 1983 action brought by an inmate 
against members of the California Adult Authority. 83 The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendants denied parole ~ retaliation for the plain-
tiff's expression of his political views, thereby violating his con-
stitutional rights under the first, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth 
amendments. 84 
In addressing the immunity issue, the court recognized that Butz 
required it not only to examine an official's location within the super-
structure of the government, 85 but also to examine the official's func-
tion. Applying the first prong of the Butz test - whether the official 
performs an adjudicatory function - the court first stated that the 
"daily task" of judges and parole board members is the same: adjudi-
cation of given cases. Next, the court concluded that the two entities 
have the same primary duty: to deliver impartial decisions that may 
affect an individual's liberty. Finally, the court concluded that the risk 
of "constant unfounded suits" from disappointed participants was the 
80. 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981). 
81. See text at note 28 supra. 
82. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam); United States ex rel Powell v. Irving, 684 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1982). 
83. 641 F.2d at 1297. California later repealed its Indeterminate Sentence Law, which per-
mitted the Adult Authority to fix prison terms and set parole release dates for every state convict. 
The legislature replaced the law with the Determinate Sentence Law, under which trial judges set 
prison terms in light of statutory guidelines. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170 (Deering 1971 & 
Supp. 1988). The legislature also replaced the Adult Authority with the Board of Prison Terms. 
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5078 (Deering 1980). 
84. 641 F.2d at 1297-98. 
85. It is critical to note that this factor weighs against absolute immunity. The Butz Court 
noted that the general rule for the class of executive officials - the class to which parole boards 
belong- is qualified immunity. 438 U.S. at 507. 
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same for courts and boards. 86 
After expressing its concern that exposure to numerous meritless 
lawsuits would hamper the parole process, the court applied the sec-
ond prong of the Butz test. After looking for institutional safeguards 
against unconstitutional conduct, the court concluded that three ex-
isted: (1) parole decisions were subject to habeas corpus challenges; 
(2) California prisoners had a right to apply for parole and due consid-
eration thereof; and (3) California prisoners had a right to a written 
statement explaining why parole was denied. 87 The Sellars court con-
cluded that "such safeguards, especially the right to habeas corpus re-
lief, are sufficient to protect petitioner's constitutional rights."88 
Although it applied a relatively new line of analysis, the Sellars 
court had arrived at a conclusion reached in the Ninth Circuit a dec-
ade earlier: absolute immunity should be given to officials processing 
parole applications. 89 As the following discussion demonstrates, ap-
plication of the two-pronged test in light of the differences between 
parole boards and courts yields a different result. 
2. The Failure of Parole Boards To Satisfy the Functional 
Comparability Test 
The flaw in Sellars is clear. The court considered basic similarities 
between parole board members and judges to the exclusion of all 
else.90 A more complete method of comparison, one taking dissimilar-
ities into account, demonstrates that parole board members and judges 
are not functionally comparable, but are, in fact, two drastically differ-
ent creatures. 
a. The first prong. The first prong of the functional comparability 
test - whether parole board members perform an "adjudicatory func-
tion"91 - requires an examination of all actions performed by parole 
board members, not only those resembling judicial actions. This ex-
amination reveals that there are, in fact, several significant differences 
in the adjudicatory functions performed by judges and parole board 
members. 
The first difference is that parole board members are less likely to 
act impartially than judges. This distinction is important because an 
86. 641 F.2d at 1302-03. 
87. 641 F.2d at 1303. 
88. 641 F.2d at 1304. 
89. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969); Villalobos v. 
Dickson, 406 F.2d 835, 835 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Bennett v. People, 406 F.2d 36, 39 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1969); Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 990 (1969). 
90. Indeed, such superficial analysis brings to mind the old saw that a mouse closely resem-
bles an elephant because both animals are gray, have disproportionately large ears, and thin tails. 
Such a method of comparison is obviously wooden and incomplete. 
91. 438 U.S. at 514. 
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environment of official bias can serve as a breeding ground for uncon-
stitutional conduct. Because one of the purposes of section 1983 is to 
deter such conduct, it should apply to the class of officials most likely 
to engage in it. 92 
The primary reason that parole board members are less likely to be 
as impartial as judges is that they are markedly more vulnerable to 
political pressures. Two pressures are brought to bear on parole board 
members: pressure from superiors, and pressure from the public. The 
power and inclination of state governors to remove members for politi-
cally unpopular decisions is well documented.93 Unlike the executive 
branch hearing examiners in Butz v Economou, parole board members 
are subject to removal by a political official rather than a neutral body 
such as a civil service commission. 94 In addition, because criminal 
corrections is a volatile public issue, parole board officials receive pres-
sure to make decisions in accordance with public sentiment. 95 
The significance of this difference between executive officials and 
judges has been misunderstood. For example, one commentator has 
suggested that the importance of this difference lies in society's expec-
tations of official conduct. According to this view, judges are expected 
to be impartial, but executive officials are not because "[p]olitical influ-
ences [are] commonly known [to] permeate the executive decision-
making process." From this premise it is argued that because there is 
no expectation of impartiality, victims of executive officials' conduct 
will feel less affronted and less anxious to file suit. Thus, the argument 
goes, because executive officials will be less likely targets for lawsuits, 
they deserve less protection from suit than judges. 96 
Though seductive in its simplicity, this argument is unsatisfactory 
for two reasons. First, it rests on the dubious assumption that the 
primary motivation for section 1983 suits is a disappointed expectation 
of an official's impartiality. A more likely motivation is anger at the 
occurrence of what the plaintiff perceives as a wrong done her at the 
hands of a state official. 97 A person illegally searched and arrested by 
a police officer - an executive official - will not feel any less injured 
92. CJ Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Lia-
bility, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 588-89 (1985) (emphasis added): 
The primary purpose of section 1983 is not solely remedial; it was enacted to deter the 
enforcement of improper state laws and customs. Providing a remedy against the user of 
such state laws was a means, not an end .... The only kind of state process that can fulfill the 
purpose of section 1983 and properly displace a section 1983 action is one that prevents the 
harm from occurring. 
93. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text. 
94. For an account of the governor's political influence, see notes 69-74 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
95. See, e.g., note 75 supra and accompanying text. 
96. See Branham, supra note 46, at 298-99. 
97. See Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1155-56 
(1981). 
258 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:241 
or inclined to file suit because she recognizes that politics permeate the 
executive branch. 
The argument is unpersuasive for a second reason. The implicit 
assumption that likelihood of civil suit is the sole criterion in deter-
mining which level of immunity officials "deserve" is equally suspi-
cious. The test in Butz v. Economou indicates that the immunity 
inquiry is far more sophisticated, taking into account the existence of 
safeguards reducing the need for private damage actions as a means 
for deterring unconstitutional conduct. Such safeguards include insu-
lation from political influence, the adversary nature of the process, and 
the ability to correct error on appeal.98 The assumption is also 
counterfactual because it ignores the reality of executive official immu-
nities. For example, although police officers and members of prison 
disciplinary boards are frequently the targets of section 1983 damages 
actions, they enjoy only qualified immunity.99 Thus, the argument 
that executive officials require a lower level of immunity because they 
are less likely to be sued is neither theoretically nor empirically sound. 
Another important difference between parole board members and 
judges is that the board members are either required or allowed to 
conduct investigations of parole candidates themselves. 100 Indeed, in 
this respect, parole board members resemble police officers or prosecu-
tors, who enjoy only qualified immunity for investigatory conduct. 101 
Other differences exist as well: Many parole board members are only 
part-time professionals, and many parole boards are subject to no edu-
98. See 438 U.S. at S12. See generally Part I.A supra. 
99. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. S47, SSS (1967) (police officers); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 
U.S. 193, 206-07 (198S) (members of prison disciplinary boards). 
100. See, e.g., Branham, supra note 46, at 301; GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-43 (198S & Supp. 
1987) (board may conduct any investigation it deems necessary); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-2S 
(B)(2) (1978) (same). 
101. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at SSS (police officers enjoy qualified immunity). 
Other courts and commentators have addressed the level of immunity for investigatory acts 
of prosecutors. See United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238,1276 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
4S6 U.S. 926 (1982); Gray v. Bell, S42 F. Supp 927 (D.D.C. 1982), affd., 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 46S U.S. 1100 (1984). See generally Comment, District and Prosecuting At-
torneys: Absolute Immunity Granted to Prosecutors Is Limited to Quasi-Judicial Acts, 20 WASH· 
BURN L.J. 630 (1981); Comment, Section 1983 and the Limits of Prosecutorial Immunity, S6 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1029 (1980). 
This bifurcated approach to prosecutor immunity - absolute immunity for case preparation 
and qualified immunity for investigatory conduct - would seem to support the Third Circuit's 
approach to parole board immunity. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra. However, the 
Third Circuit has never considered, much less employed, this analogy in its parole board immu-
nity decisions. 
As it turns out, this analogy is problematic. Unlike prosecutors, parole board members do 
more than prepare cases; they decide them. Board members on a hearing panel may be, if not 
completely biased, at least disinclined to challenge unsubstantiated claims made by their col-
leagues. Thus, the risk of tainted decisionmaking is greater in the context of parole hearings than 
in judicial proceedings, where the decisionmaker (judge or jury) forms its first impression during 
the proceeding. 
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cational requirements whatsoever. 102 
Leaving these fundamental dissimilarities aside, careful analysis 
reveals that the few characteristics shared by parole board members 
and judges are also shared by officials enjoying only qualified immu-
nity. For example, the duty to decide highly emotional controversies 
in which impartiality is demanded of the decisionmaker is shared not 
only by parole board members and judges, but also by other public 
officials, such as school board members and prison disciplinary offi-
cials. The latter two officials, despite this shared characteristic, are not 
considered quasi-judicial and thus enjoy only qualified immunity.103 
Clearly then, the requirement of impartial decisionmaking is not indic-
ative of a quasi-judicial function. 
Similarly, parole board members and judges share with other offi-
cials enjoying qualified immunity the risk of unfounded suits by dissat-
isfied parties. Indeed, any government official making decisions in 
highly volatile situations faces the risk of a "spite" suit.104 Yet this 
has not been sufficient to mandate absolute, quasi-judicial immunity 
for all government officials. As mentioned earlier, police officers enjoy 
only qualified immunity from section 1983 damages actions.105 The 
very features that parole board members have in common with judges 
are shared by other officials, but these other officials are not considered 
functionally comparable to judges. In light of the differences de-
scribed, parole board members and judges are also not functionally 
comparable. , 
Two points in this application of the first prong of the Butz test 
should now be clear. First, parole board officials are by nature polit-
ical animals: acting, thinking and functioning quite differently from 
judges. Second, the few similarities parole board members share with 
judges are also shared by other officials enjoying qualified immunity. 
102. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text. 
103. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985). 
For a full discussion of Wood, see Kattan, supra note 24, at 975-78. 
104. See Cass, supra note 97, at 1155-56 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted): 
[T]wo features of government action may make the initiation of such "spite" suits against 
officials peculiarly likely. First, many government officials are vulnerable to personal suit 
because they exercise power over others directly and visibly: ... the policeman who arrests 
a suspect, and the judge who passes sentence all are clearly identifiable as individuals whose 
actions operate immediately against a likely complainant. . . . Second . . . governmental 
action is frequently coercive in nature, intruding on individuals who may have resisted con-
tact with those officials. 
See also Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials 
for Damages, 1980 SUP. Cr. REV. 281, 294-95 (those most susceptible to damage actions are 
"street level" officials such as police officers, social workers, or parole officers); see generally P. 
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1986). 
To argue that nonjudicial officials are as likely to be the subjects of "spite" suits as judges is 
not to say that this likelihood is very high at all. Indeed, the available empirical evidence indi-
cates that this likelihood is not at all significant. See Part II infra. 
105. See note 99 supra and accompanying text. 
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In short, parole board members fail to satisfy the first prong of the 
Butz test. 
b. The second prong. The thrust of the second prong of the Butz 
test - the existence of institutional safeguards from unconstitutional 
conduct - is obvious. Section 1983 was itself designed to deter un-
constitutional conduct106 and should apply where needed. Considera-
tion of the nearly complete absence of three important safeguards from 
the parole process - political insularity of the decisionmaker, adver-
sary proceedings, and ability to correct error upon appeal - reveals 
an urgent need to permit section 1983 damages as a means of deterring 
unconstitutional acts by parole board members. 
Much has already been said about the first safeguard emphasized 
by the Butz Court: political insularity of the decisionmaker. 107 In 
light of the apparent willingness of board members to respond to both 
popular and gubernatorial pressure, it seems fair to say that in general, 
parole board members view themselves as political actors and behave 
accordingly .108 
A second safeguard important to this prong of the Butz test -
adversary proceedings -. is also conspicuously absent from the parole 
decisionmaking process. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
recognized that parole hearings are of a completely different cast than 
adversary proceedings. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Supreme Court re-
marked upon the contrast between courtroom proceedings and parole 
revocation hearings: 
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding [would] al-
ter significantly the nature of the proceeding. . . . The role of the hearing 
body itself, aptly described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discre-
tionary" as well as factfinding, may become more akin to that of a judge 
at a trial, and less attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the individual 
probationer or parolee. 
* * * 
[A] criminal trial under our system is an adversary proceeding with 
its own unique characteristics. In a revocation proceeding, on the other 
hand, the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer 
... ; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the 
members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice 
of probation or parole. 109 
106. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. 
107. See notes 68-77 supra and accompanying text. 
108. See text at note 73 supra. See generally section I.A.2 supra. 
109. 411 U.S. 778, 787-89 (1973) (superseded by statute as stated in Baldwin v. Benson, 584 
F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1978)). Although Gagnon dealt with the revocation of probation, the Court 
found no relevant difference between probation and parole revocation with respect to constitu-
tional issues. 411 U.S. at 782 & n.3. See also Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), 442 
U.S. 1, 9-10, cerL denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963) ("[T)here is not the attitude of adverse, conflicting 
objectives as between the parolee and the Board [in a revocation hearing] inherent between prose-
cution and defense in a criminal case."); Menechnino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 412 (2d Cir. 
1970), cerL denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971) ("In the last analysis the Board's determination as to 
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The Supreme Court has also noted that parole release hearings are of 
an even less adversarial nature than parole revocation hearings.110 
Thus, to characterize any sort of parole hearing as an adversary pro-
ceeding would contradict both empirical evidence and judicial charac-
terizations of the parole process. 
The third safeguard - the ability to correct error on appeal - is, 
if not entirely absent from the parole process, 111 largely meaningless 
once the constitutional injury has been inflicted.· The courts of appeals 
have almost invariably disposed of the second prong of the Butz test 
by extolling the virtues of the writ of habeas corpus as such a safe-
guard.112 But such analysis is deficient for two reasons. First, a writ 
of habeas corpus is meaningless as a safeguard to third parties. The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit missed this pqint in Nelson v. 
Balazic, 113 where the court supported its ruling of absolute immunity 
for the parole board defendants in a third-party damages suit merely 
by citing two parole denial decisions within that circuit.114 These deci-
sions awarded absolute immunity to parole officials in carrying out 
their official duties. Purporting to apply the Butz standard, the 
Balazic court stated: "the extent of immunity accorded an official de-
pends solely on the official's function. Whether claimant is an inmate 
appealing denial of parole or a victim of a parolee's criminal actions is 
irrelevant " 115 It is difficult to understand how the court could have 
reached this anomalous ·conclusion. The fact that habeas corpus ac-
tions provide no safeguard or remedy to third parties injured by a pa-
rolee is extremely relevant to the functional comparability test 
articulated in Butz. Indeed, Butz's second prong reflects the desire to 
ensure that citizens are protected from constitutional injury. The 
Balazic court skirted the issue of institutional safeguards protecting 
members of the public for an obvious reason: nqne exist.116 Thus, in 
connection with third-party actions, the second prong of the func-
tional comparability test is left unsatisfied. · 
whether a prisoner is a good parole risk represents an aspect of state prison discipline, not an 
adjudication of rights in an adversary proceeding."). 
110. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-
10 (1978). 
111. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text. 
112. See United States ex rel Powell v. Irving, 684 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1982) (writ of 
habeas corpus "adequately guard[s] prisoners' parole rights without imp!liring the performance 
of Board members"); cases at note 28 supra. 
113. 802 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1986). Balazic involved a third-party victim suit brought by 
three women kidnapped and sodomized by a recent parolee. 
114. 802 F.2d at 1078 (citing Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1983); and Gale v. 
Moore, 763 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
115. 802 F.2d at 1078 (emphasis added). 
116. The absence of any such safeguard may also explain the hedging of the Ninth Circuit in 
Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1297 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981): "We 
leave to another day the question whether parole board officials enjoy any immunity from civil 
rights suits brought by persons injured by a dangerous parolee." 
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The courts' reliance upon the writ of habeas corpus as an impor-
tant safeguard is deficient for a second reason - a reason relating to 
parolees rather than victims. While a writ of habeas corpus may be 
useful as a safeguard against wrongful parole denials, it fails to prevent 
wrongful parole revocations. For example, a writ of habeas corpus 
cannot prevent the practice of "Jail Therapy," an apparently com-
mon, albeit Kafkaesque, practice in which persons on probation or 
parole are arrested, imprisoned, and then released without a hear-
ing.117 A writ of habeas corpus, if necessary, only secures release; it 
cannot guard against compensable harm a parolee may incur before 
release.118 
Safeguards like those found in the judicial system are conspicu-
ously absent from the parole system. Thus, the need for the section 
1983 safeguard is clear. But would fulfilling this need bring an end to 
vigorous decisionmaking by competent public officials? It would not. 
In fact, there is good reason to believe that exposure to civil liability 
will greatly improve the parole process. 
II. THE IMPACT OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ON 
PAROLE BOARD ACTIVITY 
A second assumption behind the majority and minority ap-
proaches to parole board immunity is that, for at least some officials, 
absolute immunity is necessary to ensure sound decisionmaking. In 
particular, three concerns about the impact of civil exposure on public 
officials have surfaced: (1) that limited immunity would dampen vig-
orous decisionmaking, 119 (2) that public officials' valuable time would 
be consumed litigating meritless claims, 120 and (3) that the prospect of 
117. See, e.g., National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, The 
Parole Grant Hearing. (1973), reprinted in w. AMOS & c. NEWMAN, PAROLE 5, 21 (1975) (pa-
role practice); Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1983) (parolee repeatedly arrested on 
unsubstantiated charges of parole violation); PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 66, at 137 
(probation practice). 
118. See, e.g., Harper v. Jeffries, 808·F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1986) (wrongful revocation resulting 
in parolee's business losses, nonpayment of debts, divorce, and loss of child custody). 
119. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 
(1950) (liability would "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, 
in the unflinching discharge of their duties"). Several commentators have rigidly adhered to this 
view. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 104, at 282 ("[A] decision maker with a heightened conscious-
ness of the risk of liability for error may respond in ways that elevate personal interest above 
official duty, supplanting one type of error with another .•.• "); Cass, supra note 97, at 1155-56 
(As individuals particularly prone to "spite suits," public officials must be protected from influ-
ences on decisionmaking.). But see Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 
YALE L.J. 322, 331 (1969) (arguing that belief that the risk ofliability would intimidate judicial 
officers presumes a weakness in their character). 
120. See Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d at 1303 ("[T]ime spent in depositions and on the 
witness stand defending their actions would leave these overburdened [parole board officials] 
with even less time to perform their crucial tasks."). Recently, the Supreme Court expressed its 
dissatisfaction with the lack of evidentiary support for this sort of argument. The Court cau-
tioned: "Absolute immunity •.. is 'strong medicine, justified only when the danger of [officials' 
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civil liability will scare competent persons away from those posi-
tions.121 In theory at least, these concerns appear to be compelling.122 
However, an examination of the facts demonstrates that these con-
cerns are hardly overwhelming. 
An examination of the reality of section 1983 litigation, particu-
larly prisoner petitions, reveals that the assumptions underlying each 
concern about qualified immunity lack an empirical basis. Rather 
than hampering sound decisionmaking, qualified immunity should 
promote more conscientious board action. 
A. The Reality of Section 1983 Litigation 
At first glance, the large number of section 1983 filings, particu-
larly those by prisoners, seems reason enough to cloak every official 
connected with the penal system with absolute immunity. In this dec-
ade alone, the number of state prisoner civil rights petitions has risen 
from about 17,000 to over 20,000 per year.123 Commentators are fond 
of citing such large numbers as a preamble to a critique of damages 
actions for constitutional injuries.124 
However relevant those figures are to concerns about the strain 
being] deftect[ed from the effective performance of their duties] is very great.' " Forrester v. 
White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 545 (1988) (quoting Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 660 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(Posner, J., dissenting)). 
121. See Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a 
Critique, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 526, 529 n. 19 (1977); Comment, Entity and Official Immunities 
Under 42 U.S.C Section 1983: The Supreme Court Adopts a Solely Objective Test, 28 S.D.L. 
REV. 336, 339 (1983). Professor Freed argues that the threat of civil liability is bound to scare 
away those with the broadest career choices, whom he considers to be the most able candidates 
for the positions. The result of such a threat, Freed contends, will be the occupation of public 
offices by residual applicants, leaving governance in the hands of those most likely to do damage. 
There can be little doubt that persons currently enjoying qualified immunity - such as gover-
nors, policemen, and public university presidents - would take issue with the implications of 
Freed's hypothesis. Moreover, recent commentary indicates that Freed's theoretical outcome 
has failed to materialize. See R. SPURRIER, RIGHTS, WRONGS AND REMEDIES: SECTION 1983 
AND CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VINDICATION, 141 (1986) ("[T]here is no evidence that the po-
tential Section 1983 liability of [public] offic[ials] has caused a less qualified group of applicants 
to seek the positions.''). 
122. However, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize the tendency of prisoners to file 
numerous and often frivolous lawsuits as sufficient reason to grant absolute immunity. See 
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 207-08 (1985). 
123. 1986 ADMIN. OFF. u. s. Crs. ANN. REP. 179 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 REPORT]. It is 
important to note that these are aggregate figures. For example, they do not disclose what frac-
tion of the total filings were directed at parole board members, or what proportion of the peti-
tions sought damages, as opposed to injunctive relief. Nonetheless, there is mounting evidence 
that the proportion of suits brought against parole officials is relatively small. See Bailey, The 
Realities of Prisoners' Cases Under 42 U.S.C § 1983: A Statistical Survey in the Northern District 
of Illinois, 6 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 527, 544 (1975); Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations 
and an Empirical Study, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 482, 538 (1982); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A 
Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REv. 610, 623 (1979). 
124. See, e.g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1980). Although Pro-
fessor Whitman generally does not favor damages actions under § 1983, she concedes that they 
may be useful in cases of egregious constitutional violations. See id. at 65-67. 
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section 1983 actions exert upon judicial resources, 125 it would be seri-
ously misleading to rely upon them to draw conclusions about the ef-
fect of qualified immunity upon parole board members. In the first 
place, filings against board members are a fraction of the annual total, 
with prisoners filing suits against other officials with whom they more 
frequently come into contact. More significantly, of that fraction, we 
can expect only three of ten filings ever to come to board members' 
attention. Most prisoner petitions are short-lived; in fact, about sev-
enty percent of prisoner petitions are dismissed before service is ever 
delivered upon the defendant.126 A federal pauper's suit statute allows 
judges (or judicial clerks) to prescreen and dismiss a petition "if the 
allegation of poverty is untrue, or if [the court is] satisfied that the 
action is frivolous or malicious. " 127 Because most prisoner suits are 
brought in forma pauperis, 128 this screening device significantly 
reduces the likelihood that a parole board member will be the subject 
of a mere "spite" suit filed by a prisoner. 
Significantly, studies tracing prisoner suits from the time of filing 
to final disposition also show that prisoner suits would not actually 
entangle parole board members in extensive discovery. For example, 
one national study of prisoner suits conducted over a five-year period 
revealed that only three pro se litigants received answers to interroga-
tories, and none received documents or deposition testimony from de-
fendants.129 Clearly, the notion that parole board members protected 
only by qualified immunity would waste time and money preparing for 
frivolous litigation seems wildly exaggerated. 
Moreover, the myth that parole board officials would waste pre-
cious days in trial is unfounded for two reasons. First, Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald enables defendants to dispose of frivolous claims by summary 
judgment.13o If a plaintiff fails to show that the parole board mem-
ber's actions violated a "clearly established" constitutional right, the 
parole board member is entitled to claim immunity from damages lia-
bility.131 At that point, involvement in litigation would cease. Sec-
125. This is, of course, the subject of another Note altogether. Professor Turner offers us a 
window on the issue, revealing that the strain is not so much on judges as it is on law clerks. See 
Turner, supra note 123, at 611-12, 617-21. Furthermore, the question of whether the large 
number of filings, particularly prisoner filings, indicates an unjustified strain on resources is at 
least as empirical as it is normative. For an indication that it is not, see notes 155-56 infra and 
accompanying text. 
126. See Turner, supra note 123, at 617-18. 
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982) (emphasis added). 
128. See Bailey, supra note 123, at 530; Turner, supra note 123 at 617. 
129. See Turner, supra note 123, at 624. 
130. 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.35 (1982); see also text at note 24 supra. 
131. 457 U.S. at 818. For some, the phrase, "clearly established constitutional right" is al-
most a contradiction in terms. See generally The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. RBv. 
62, 226-36 (1982) (contending that Harlow will leave numerous plaintiffs without a remedy in 
ambiguous or unexplored areas of the law); Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, The Lower Courts 
Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
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ond, even if the suit survives summary judgment, extensive 
involvement by the parole board member herself is unlikely, given the 
past record of prisoner actions. In 1986 for example, of the relatively 
small number of prisoner suits that went to trial, nearly ninety percent 
consumed three days or less.132 Furthermore, few cases have arisen in 
which the defendant was required to make any appearance in court.133 
Thus, the ugly threat of parole board members being dragged into the 
quagmire of meritless litigation appears to be chimerical. 
Finally, the danger that qualified immunity would expose parole 
board members to financial devastation is similarly illusory. Damage 
awards in prisoner litigation have tended to be infrequent and small. 
The same five-year study of prisoner suits revealed that out of the 
thousands of prisoner filings made within that period, only two re-
sulted in monetary liability: awards for six dollars and two hundred 
dollars. 134 An earlier study of one federal district yielded similarly 
meager results. Of 218 suits filed in one year, only one resulted in 
monetary liability: five hundred dollars for injuries sustained from 
beatings by prison guards.135 In any event, it is difficult to understand 
why a board member, having been found to violate a clearly estab-
lished constitutional right causing cognizable injury, should escape fi-
nancial liability. The damages provision in section 1983 reflects that 
very value judgment. Thus this concern too, is born more of conjec-
ture than of reality.136 
The view that qualified immunity, exposing parole board officials 
to a flood of meritless "spite" suits, would result in poor decisionmak-
ing by underqualified officials seems to have support in th~ory alone. 
Indeed it is disturbing that this view has enjoyed so much support in 
light of the easily accessible evidence to the contrary. Of course, this 
sort of error is neither unique nor new. Bertrand Russell warned: 
If the matter is one that can be settled by observation, make the ob-
servation yourself. Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking 
that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking 
Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted. He did not do 
901, 922-32 (1984) (discussing relevant factors in determining whether controlling law was 
clearly established at time of injury). However, this problem is unlikely to arfse in connection 
with parole board actions because the parameters of prisoners' rights have been clearly estab-
lished in Morrissey and Greenholtz. See text at notes 4-8 supra. 
132. 1986 REPORT, supra note 123, at 223 (Table C-8) (of 445 prisoner civil-rights trials in 
1986, 396 were resolved in three days or less). 
133. See Turner, supra note 123, at 624. 
134. See id., at 624-25. 
135. Bailey, supra note 123, at 531 & n.21. 
136. It may be contended that the factor most relevant to parole board actions is the per-
ceived, rather than the real, threat of monetary liability. If this contention has any weight at all, 
it is for arguing that parole board members should be better informed as to the real risks to 
which they are exposed. Risk management programs may be able to provide such information. 
See text following note 146 infra. 
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so because he thought he knew. 137 
Like Aristotle, the courts have relied too heavily on intuition. Had 
they bothered to examine the hard data, they would have quickly con-
cluded that the prospect of prisoner litigation over parole board ac-
tions is not threatening enough to induce decisional paralysis. This is 
not to say, of course, that a section 1983 damages action is a toothless 
mechanism. In fact, allowing actions under section 1983 will improve 
the parole process by creating incentives for more balanced and consti-
tutionally respectful decisionmaking. 
B. Qualified Immunity and Enhanced Parole Board 
Decisionmaking. 
There are two reasons to believe that exposure to civil liability -
limited as it is to violations of clearly established constitutional 
rights138 - will produce more conscientious decisionmaking by parole 
board officials. First, the threat of suit by either a prisoner or an in-
jured third party for malicious or reckless conduct should inspire a 
balanced approach to parole decisionmaking. Second, the risk of civil 
liability may spur efforts to train parole board officials to better respect 
and preserve individual rights. 
1. Balanced Decisionmaking 
Qualified immunity creates a Scylla-Charybdis system of incen-
tives. By placing parole board officials between section 1983 suits by 
prisoners on the one side, and third-party victims on the other, quali-
fied immunity motivates parole board members to steer a middle 
course and not engage in unconstitutional conduct. Specifically, ex-
posing parole board members to twin liability sends two clear 
messages to parole board members: If members act maliciously in 
connection with decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole, they may 
have to make monetary reparation to the injured prisoner or parolee. 
Likewise, if they recklessly parole a highly dangerous prisoner, they 
run the risk of liability to a third-party victim. In such a position, 
parole board members are unlikely to drift toward draconian or cava-
lier attitudes toward prisoners and parolees. 
A comparison of the expected values of each type of suit demon-
strates that neither prospect is so menacing as to paralyze parole 
boards with indecision. On the one hand, prisoners filing section 1983 
petitions in forma pauperis face several obstacles to success, including 
prescreening of the complaint for frivolity or malice,139 limited legal 
137. B. RUSSELL, An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish, in UNPOPULAR EssAYS 71, 103 (1950) 
(emphasis added). 
138. See text at note 22 supra. 
139. See text at notes 127-28 supra. 
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expertise, and apathy or hostility from the bench. 140 Although these 
hurdles may be lowered somewhat once courts accept qualified immu-
nity and if (a large "if" indeed) courts overcome hostility toward pris-
oner suits, the expected value of such suits is unlikely to be exorbitant. 
In the first place, prisoners tend to receive extremely modest damages 
awards. Because courts are aware of the inverse relationship between 
large damages awards and the robustness of a public official's decision-
making, this trend is likely to continue. Second, there is little reason 
to believe that many prisoner suits would proceed past the receipt of a 
settlement offer. Prisoners are well aware of their limited legal re-
sources and are unlikely to tum down a settlement in order to gamble 
at trial. 
Different legal obstacles should give victim's suits a similarly low 
value. Although a number of courts and analysts have placed a high 
monetary value on human life, 141 two barriers to success should dis-
count that value. First, it is unclear whether a section 1983 action 
may be barred by a state survivability statute if the plaintiff has died. 
While the Supreme Court has held that state survival action statutes 
may terminate section 1983 claims when a plaintiff dies, 142 the Court 
has reserved judgment on whether the same applies when the plaintiff/ 
decedent's death results from the defendant's alleged unconstitutional 
conduct. 143 
The causation obstacle should serve as the second discounting fac-
tor. In particular, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to character-
ize acts performed by a wrongfully released parolee as "state action." 
The Court declined to find the necessary causal connection in Marti-
nez v. California. 144 In Martinez, a fifteen-year old girl was tortured 
and murdered by a parolee five months after his release from prison. 
The parolee, a convicted rapist, had been committed to a state mental 
140. See text at notes 152-54 infra. 
141. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding $100,000 
award for decedent's loss of life and enjoyment ofliving as well as $25,000 in punitive damages); 
Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (upholding $1.5 million gen-
eral damage award for unconstitutional deprivation of life); Earley, What's a Life Worth?, Wash. 
Post, June 9, 1985 (Magazine) at 11 (OSHA establishing $3.5 million as value of "statistical 
life"). 
142. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-93 (1978); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 
U.S. 247, 258 n.13 (1978) (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorizes federal courts to adopt state 
common law for § 1983 remedies). 
143. See Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183, 184-89 (1977). Several federal courts have said 
that it does not. See Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1220-24 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 821 (1983) (state law cannot terminate § 1983 actions arising from the decedent's death); 
Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25, 26-27 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (state law may not interfere with § 1983 
remedies where constitutional tort causes death); O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional 
Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-49 (E.D. Va. 1981) (state law may not deny§ 1983 recovery for 
injuries caused by deprivation of decedent's life); cf Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. 
Supp. 282, 292-97 (D. Colo. 1982) (state law may only expand, not contract, § 1983 remedies). 
Still, the question is open in many circuits. 
144. 444 U.S. 277 (1980). 
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hospital and thereafter sentenced for a term of one to twenty years 
with a recommendation that he not be paroled. Despite this warning, 
the parole board later released the inmate. The Supreme Court af-
firmed dismissal of the action for three reasons. First, the killer was 
not an "agent" of the parole board. Second, there was a five-month 
time lapse between parole and the murder (which the Court deemed 
"too remote a consequence" of the defendant's actions). Finally, the 
defendant was not aware the decedent faced any "special danger" not 
shared by the public at large.14s 
Thus, although third-party victim suits against parole board mem-
bers create the potential for large damages awards, their expected 
value is discounted by difficulties in successful prosecution. Put differ-
ently, the number of successful third-party victim suits meeting the 
duty and causation requirements of Martinez and its progeny is un-
likely to be large enough to overthrow the parole system. The parity 
of the threats posed by prisoner suits and third-party victim suits al-
lows them to serve as an important moderating influence on parole 
boards. But while such liability will force parole board members to be 
more aware of the rights of prisoners and the public, the prospect of 
liability will not be so menacing as to induce decisional paralysis. 
2. Incentives To Enhance Parole Board Quality 
Because states may ultimately foot the bill for parole board mem-
bers' liability, they may wish to reduce that risk by taking steps to 
145. 444 U.S. at 285. A number of courts have used Martinez to dismiss § 1983 claims 
against state officials for injuries or deaths caused by parolees. For example, Fox v. Custis, 712 
F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983), involved a § 1983 suit by three women who were variously raped, 
beaten, shot, stabbed, and set on fire by a parolee. The complaint alleged that the parole board 
refused to revoke parole despite knowledge that the parolee had violated his parole terms and 
was already suspected of an act of arson resulting in a woman's death. The court affirmed dis-
missal of the action on the ground that "the state agent defendants here were 'unaware that the 
[claimants] as distinguished from the public at large faced any special danger.' " 712 F.2d at 88 
(quoting Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285). See also Janan v. Trammell, 785 F.2d 557, 560 (6th Cir. 
1986) (no § 1983 cause of action stated where parolee, having made threats to a police officer's 
wife and violated parole, murdered someone who was "simply a member of the public at large"); 
Humann v. Wilson, 696 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 
In fact, some courts have read Martinez so restrictively as to deny victims a cause of action 
under§ 1983 even where the defendant was aware of the risk of harm to them. See, e.g. Estate of 
Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 721 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 270 (1986) (plaintiff's 
decedent murdered by man who had previously threatened her life and who had been hospital-
ized for mental evaluation as a result of her complaints); Jones v. Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642 (11th Cir. 
1985) (no special relationship existed where furloughed prisoner raped plaintiff instrumental in 
his initial conviction for burglarizing her home); cf. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) 
(public official's mere negligence in failing to protect one prisoner from another not actionable 
under § 1983). 
However, other courts have been more willing to find sufficient causation. See, e.g., Dudosh 
v. City of Allentown, 629 F. Supp. 849, 853-55 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Hardmon v. County of Lehigh, 
613 F. Supp. 649, 652-53 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (cause of action stated where prisoner attacked plain-
tiff's child after officials had been informed prisoner had threatened plaintiff and broken window 
of her home two days earlier); P.L.C. v. Housing Auth., 588 F. Supp. 961, 965-66 (W.D. Pa. 
1984). 
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prevent unconstitutional parole decisions from being made. Thus, the 
second positive result of exposure to liability via qualified immunity 
may be an effort to develop a better-trained body of parole board 
officials. 
One such effort may be the introduction of public risk-manage-
ment programs into parole agencies. These programs seek to identify 
practices vulnerable to civil exposure and to remedy them through 
training and supervision.146 A number of local governments have im-
plemented risk management programs in response to a Supreme Court 
decision holding that a municipality may be sued as a "person" under 
section 1983.147 Features of such programs may include: (1) instruc-
tion/training of officials as to constitutional requirements; (2) estab-
lishment of an internal department for the investigation and 
documentation of high-risk practices; and (3) periodic review of offi-
cial actions by a designated compliance officer or legal counsel.148 In 
addition to increasing awareness about the constitutional implications 
of parole board actions, risk management programs could allay any 
fears that tenure on a state parole board is a ticket to financial and 
professional ruin. 
From this analysis it becomes clear that qualified immunity for pa-
role board members could provide the right incentives. The members 
themselves would have incentive to pay attention to the rights of pris-
oners and potential victims - the public. This dual exposure to liabil-
ity would not, however, paralyze the boards, because the onus of 
successful prosecution would be heavy. Successful claimants would 
probably be rare, but their existence alone would be a positive step in 
curbing parole board constitutional violations. A second incentive 
provided by the imposition of qualified immunity would be the imple-
mentation of better risk-management techniques on the state level. 
Parole board members can be taught how to perform their duties 
within constitutional bounds. Both of these important incentives 
would improve the current parole board decisionmaking process im-
mensely. But the benefits of section 1983 are not only found at the 
level of parole board decisionmaking. These benefits would also be 
apparent in the realm of simple justice - compensating those suffering 
the violation of their constitutional rights by parole board members. 
146. See INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT AssOCIATION, PUBLIC OFFICIALS' LIABIL-
ITY (1979). 
147. For an example of one county's response to the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. 
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), see id., at 26-28. 
148. See id., at 21-24; Peters, Municipal Liability After Owen v. City of Independence and 
Maine v. Thiboutot, 13 URB. LAW. 407, 446-47 & n.190 (1981). 
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Ill. OVERCOMING INDIFFERENCE TO COMPENSATION UNDER 
SECTION 1983 
The debate over whether section 1983 damages actions are an ef-
fective deterrent or an unnecessary hindrance to state officials has been 
so heated that the other purpose of section 1983 - to compensate the 
victims of constitutional deprivations - has been ignored. However, 
an examination of this important aim reveals a pressing need to deny 
parole board members absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from civil 
suits. 
Courts and commentators have been guilty of slighting this issue 
for two reasons. First, they have mistakenly assumed that a habeas 
corpus action provides a sufficient remedy to prisoners. Second, they 
have largely ignored the possibility that members of the public may 
suffer constitutional deprivations as a result of a parole board mem-
ber's actions. This section will address these two misconceptions and 
direct attention to the needs - for both financial and symbolic relief 
- that awarding qualified immunity to parole board members can 
satisfy. 
A. The Inadequacy of Habeas Corpus Relief 
Virtually every court awarding absolute immunity to parole board 
members has found the existence of a habeas corpus remedy to be a 
decisive factor. 149 Yet careful analysis shows that this civil remedy is 
woefully inadequate for both prisoners and third-party victims because 
it is not appropriate relief for a damages claim, and cannot be used at 
all by third-party victims. 
1. Prisoner Relief: Suffering from the Sins of Excess 
An attempt to account for judges' reluctance to award damages to 
prisoners who have suffered constitutional deprivations yields no easy 
answer. One seemingly obvious explanation is that the courts have 
mistaken the safeguard value of a habeas corpus remedy, limited as it 
is, 150 for compensation. However, in light of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in Preiser v. Rodriguez, that mistake is not easy to make: 
If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other 
than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something 
other than immediate or more speedy release - the traditional purpose 
of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an 
appropriate or available federal remedy. 151 
Because the distinction has been clearly made, it is hard to imagine 
149. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. 
150. See text at notes 112-13 supra. 
151. 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) (emphasis added). 
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that the reasoning of the courts of appeals is merely the product of 
judicial oversight. 
A more plausible explanation for the denial of damages awards to 
prisoners is the well-documented apathy and even antipathy many fed-
eral judges hold toward prisoner litigants. Judges not only frequently 
complain about the growing number of section 1983 prisoner suits, 152 
but they express outright hostility toward petitioners who bring them 
as well. 153 This hostility begins with the inference that the large 
number of prisoner civil rights petitions, about 20,000 in 1986,154 
means that section 1983 is being used to bring the "wrong" kind of 
suit. The falsity of this inference has not escaped criticism from com-
mentators and at least one Supreme Court Justice.155 Nevertheless, 
this fallacy remains because judges are prone to reinforce it with a few 
anecdotal examples of abuse they have heard of or witnessed.156 
Given the not-so-subtle predisposition against prisoner section 
1983 suits, it is not altogether surprising to find courts slighting the 
issue of prisoner compensation. In parole denial cases, the court may 
view the monetary loss due to prolonged imprisonment as fairly negli-
gible.157 This generalization, dubious in connection with parole re-
lease decisions, 158 is clearly inaccurate in connection with parole 
revocations. Wrongfully imprisoning a parolee can result in very real 
monetary damages such as loss of employment or business opportuni-
ties.159 In sum, the general statement that habeas corpus suits provide 
adequate compensation for prisoners smacks of judicial impatience 
152. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 556 n.16 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting); Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. l, 27 & n.16 (1980) (Powell J., dissenting); Gittlemakker v. Prasse, 428 
F.2d 1, 2 & n.l (3rd Cir. 1970). 
153. See, e.g., United States ex rel Pope v. Williams, 326 F. Supp 279 (E.D. Pa. 1971); 
Bailey, supra note 123, at 547-49; Turner, supra note 123, at 638 n.144. 
154. See 1986 REPORT, supra note 123, at 179 (Table C-2A). 
155. See Eisenberg, supra note 123, at 538 ("[M]ost prisoner section 1983 complaints [stud-
ied] were not plainly trivial assertions implicating little or no federal interest."); Blackmun, Sec-
tion 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights - Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade 
Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. l, 21 (1985) ("I suspect that improvements in prison conditions of 
recent years are traceable in large part, and perhaps primarily, to actions under§ 1983 .... "). 
156. See Eisenberg, supra note 123, at 536. ("[T]he judge needs only slight anecdotal evi-
dence to conclude that section 1983 is a source of abuse. The evidence may consist of a case or 
two of his own ... or courthouse scuttlebutt may suffice.") 
157. Determining what amount would be proper for wrongful incru;ceration is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. For a fairly broad treatment of this issue see Newman, Suing the Law-
breakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Miscon-
duct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978). 
158. Actions of parole board members can be financially devastating to parolees. For exam-
ple, in Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1983), it was alleged that a parolee lost his 
livelihood as a racehorse trainer after parole board members disseminated false information to 
the State Racing Commission. Specifically, the officials distorted the parolee's criminal record 
and spread false rumors that the parolee was connected with several unsolved murders. Upon 
hearing this information, the Racing Commission revoked the parolee's racing license. 714 F.2d 
at 910. 
159. See note 118 supra. 
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with prisoner suits.160 Habeas corpus actions seek a different remedy. 
2. Victim Suits: Guilt by Association? 
The granting of absolute immunity based upon the existence of an 
alternative habeas corpus remedy is even more bewildering when con-
sidering the opposite side of the section 1983 coin: damages suits 
brought by third-party victims of parolee crimes. 
A writ of habeas corpus can provide no compensation (or consola-
tion) to nonprisoners. Yet, in Nelson v. Balazic, 161 the Eighth Circuit 
failed to consider this self-evident truth. Instead, the court ignored the 
victims' plea for relief and woodenly applied precedent from earlier 
prisoner suits. 162 It appears that by being lumped together with the 
perennially unpopular prisoner litigants, third-party victims have been 
met with cool judicial suspicion. 
In light of the compensatory purpose of section 1983, the need to 
permit citizens stating a cause of action to seek money damages should 
no longer be excluded from the immunity calculus. Compensation for 
the loss of life or liberty resulting from unconstitutional conduct was 
one of the driving forces behind the enactment of section 1983 in the 
first place.163 Awarding parole board members absolute immunity can 
only serve to thwart that central purpose. In the relatively rare case 
where a third-party victim meets the heavy standard necessary to sus-
tain a section 1983 action, 164 absolute immunity constitutes a complete 
and unnecessary bar to recovery. 
B. The Symbolic Value of Section 1983 Compensation 
Finally, requiring parole board members to answer for the consti-
tutional injuries they inflict provides symbolic relief by vindicating the 
rights of civilians and prisoners alike. Section 1983 stands for the 
principle that state officials are not above the Constitution. 165 Subject-
ing parole board officials to liability for established constitutional inju-
ries ensures the continued vitality of that principle. 
This symbolic value has not gone unnoticed by at least one sitting 
member of the Supreme Court: "Today, section 1983 properly stands 
for . . . the compritment of our society to be governed by law and to 
protect the rights of those without power against oppression at the 
160. For one federal judge's plea to his colleagues for increased patience, see generally Doyle, 
The Court's Responsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JUDICATURE 406 (1973). 
161. 802 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1986) (§ 1983 damages action by three women kidnapped and 
sodomized by a recklessly released parolee). 
162. 802 F.2d at 1078. 
163. See generally Kinoy, supra note 12. 
164. See notes 14245 supra and accompanying text. 
165. See notes 12-13 supra. 
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hands of the powerful."166 Thus, Justice Blackmun concludes, our 
political system can ill afford to allow section 1983 to fade away. One 
commentator has gone so far as to assert that "[s]ociety ... has a right 
to insist that when public officials conduct themselves egregiously, 
they do so at their own risk."167 
The need to call officials to account by imposing the threat of civil 
liability for their actions appears even stronger in consideration of the 
increased power of unelected members of state government. As in-
creasing numbers of nonelected, nonjudicial officials acquire the ability 
to violate individuals' constitutional rights, there is a pressing need for 
society to exert at least some form of control.168 Qualified immunity 
serves this need without unduly interfering with the day-to-day con-
duct of the officials. 
However, it has been suggested that damages relief is an unneces-
sary method of serving that need. 169 Equitable or declaratory relief is 
better suited to the task, it is argued, because in cases where the affir-
mation of rights is most important, courts are least likely to award 
damages. 170 
When applied to parole board actions, this argument is unpersua-
sive for two reasons. First, its premise- that "[a] litigant cares most 
about getting a declaration of constitutional protection when the right 
that he is asserting has not yet been generally acknowledged by the 
courts, or ... extended to the facts of his case"171 - does not readily 
apply to suits against parole board members. In those cases, the oppo-
site may be true: a person may care most about constitutional protec-
tion of well-established rights. An egregious violation of her 
constitutional rights seems more likely to produce more outrage, and 
thus a greater need for affirmation of those rights, than a "borderline" 
violation. Indeed, in the case of the latter, the average person may be 
wholly unaware that a constitutional right is implicated. 172 
The second reason this argument is unpersuasive in the parole con-
166. Blackmun, supra note 155, at 28. Although Justice Blackmun speaks in contemporane-
ous terms, it should be noted that this idea is not new. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall long ago 
emphasized that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individ-
ual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
167. Hermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 11 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 
1175, 1199 (1977) (emphasis added). 
168. Cf. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 266, 564 P.2d 1227, 
1233 (1977) (en bane) ("In this day of increasing power wielded by governmental officials, abso-
lute immunity for nonjudicial, nonlegislative officials is outmoded and even dangerous. ") 
(emphasis added). 
169. See Whitman, supra note 124, at 52-53. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
172. Again, this is not to say that litigants advancing test cases in constitutional law do not 
have an important interest. The point here is that citizens who have undeniably been deprived of 
a constitutional right may have a greater need to see that the guilty state official is made responsi-
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text is that it does not take the needs of victims into account. As the 
Butz Court bluntly pointed out, "[i]njunctive or declaratory relief is 
useless to a person who has already been injured."173 Worse still, a 
federal court's award of only nominal r~lief stands as a symbol of the 
federal government's indifference toward the needs of victims created 
by state official misconduct.174 Thus, for citizens whose clearly estab-
lished constitutional rights have been violated, "[a] damage award 
under section 1983 can serve as an assertion with bite that the federal 
government regards the right as important enough to merit federal 
protection." 175 
Given the symbolic value of allowing section 1983 suits against 
parole board members, and the inadequacy of habeas corpus relief for 
prisoners and victims alike, it is clear that qualified, not absolute, im-
munity should be given to parole board members. Courts have rarely 
reached this conclusion, yet an examination of the facts allows no 
other. 
CONCLUSION 
A majority of the courts considering the appropriate level of parole 
board member immunity have opted for absolute, quasi-judicial im-
munity for some, if not all, parole board actions. Although these deci-
sions cannot be said to have been the product of careful application of 
the Butz test, the policy reasons behind them have an intuitive appeal: 
parole board officials face the unenviable task of attempting to predict 
the future behavior of persons hitherto deemed unfit to circulate in 
society. The workload is high, the plaudits few. Thus, it seems unfair 
to expose these officials to money damages for decisions they are re-
quired to make. It also seems inevitable that any level of civil exposure 
would become so burdensome that all decisionmaking would suffer. 
But intuition is an unreliable method of analysis. Seemingly obvi-
ous preconceptions have the habit of withering in the stark light of 
reality. Qualified immunity would not expose parole board officials to 
liability for reasonable errors in judgment. Such judicial second-guess-
ing would not only be burdensome, but would constitute an intrusion 
upon executive power. Instead, qualified immunity would only come 
into play in extreme cases, where the injury is the violation of a clearly 
established constitutional right. 
Practical realities about the results of prisoner litigation also have 
ble for her misdeeds. The prospective nature of equitable relief makes it less likely to satisfy an 
injured party's concerns than monetary relief. 
173. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (emphasis added). 
174. See Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIP. L. 
REV. 1242, 1281 (1979) ("[N]ominal damages will more often have the symbolic effect of dimin-
ishing the legitimacy of the plaintiff's complaint."). 
175. Whitman, supra note 124, at 52. 
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exposed the unreliability of intuition. , The belief that qualified immu-
nity would mire board members in vexatious litigation - the very 
heart of the absolute immunity argument - is soundly contradicted 
by the empirical evidence. The available empirical data on prisoner 
litigation point unwaveringly to one conclusion: the large number of 
prisoner filings is deceptive because few cases advance as far as discov-
ery. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already said as much. Even in a 
less hostile judicial atmosphere, relatively few claimants would prevail 
at trial. But the existence of the possibility of liability would be an 
important moderating influence on parole boards. 
Instead of resting on a quicksand foundation of intuition, anec-
dotes and stereotypes, the federal courts should build upon two firm 
realities. First, boards are not benches after all- the gulf between the 
two in terms of procedure, political accountability, background, and 
training is almost immeasurable. Second, section 1983 was designed 
to deter unconstitutional conduct by compelling state wrongdoers to 
compensate those they injure.176 By grounding their analyses in real-
ity, the courts must inevitably conclude that denying absolute, quasi-
judicial immunity to parole board members is neither unwarranted 
nor unfair. Qualified immunity will not only help raise the level of 
parole board conduct, but provide both compensatory and symbolic 
relief to victims of constitutional deprivations. 
- Julio A. Thompson 
176. See generally Kincy, supra note 12. 
